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False-Belief Representation and
Attribution in Preschoolers: Testing
a Graded-Representation hypothesis
Nicolas Chevalier and Agnès Blaye
One of the most important milestones in preschool development is the formation of a
theory of mind (ToM) at about 4 years of age. ToM encompasses both the understanding
that people may have different mental  representations of  the world that guide their
behaviors, and the attribution of mental states (such as beliefs, intentions, or desires) to
others and self. A widely used measure designed to tap this cognitive acquisition is the
false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In this task, children see a character put an
object in one of two locations. While the character is away, the object is moved to the
second location. The children are then asked to predict in which location the character
will look for the object. Generally, 3-year-old children fail to attribute a false belief to the
character and predict his actions accordingly, while the majority of 4-year-olds succeed
(for a review, see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).
Evidence has recently accumulated in favor of a close relationship between ToM and
executive functions, whose developmental patterns are parallel. “Executive functions” is
an  umbrella  term  referring  to  the  “cognitive  processes  that  underlie  flexible  goal-
directed behavior” (Hughes, 2002, p. 69).  Executive measures are positively correlated
with ToM tasks  (Carlson & Moses,  2001).  In  one of  these  measures,  the Dimensional
Change Card Sort task (DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995), children are instructed to sort
cards according to a first pair of rules (e.g., color rules), and then to switch to a second
pair  of  rules  (e.g.,  shape rules).  The DCCS and the false-belief  task display the same
developmental pattern and are positively correlated (e.g., Frye et al., 1995). Moreover, 3-
year-olds show some rigidity on the prepotent response in both tasks. In the DCCS, they
perseverate even though the new rules are repeated before each trial.  Similarly, they
answer on the basis of reality even when they are explicitly told about the character’s
false belief (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). Finally, Kloo and Perner (2003) trained children on
either  the false-belief  task or  the DCCS.  The results  revealed mutual  transfer  effects
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between the two tasks, providing further evidence for a close relationship between ToM
and executive functions. 
Several  theoretical  proposals  have  been  made  in  an  attempt  to  account  for  this
relationship.  For  instance,  according  to  the  Cognitive  Complexity  and  Control  (CCC)
theory (Zelazo et al., 1995; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 2003), the DCCS and false-
belief  tasks  are characterized by the same hierarchical  rule  structure.  In both tasks,
children  must  switch  between two  setting  conditions  in  order  to  determine  how to
respond: they must switch between color and shape rules in the DCCS, and between the
character’s  perspective  and  reality  in  the  false-belief task.  Perspective-switching  is
possible once children have established a higher-order rule that guides them in deciding
when to reason from each perspective. Such higher-order rules are beyond the scope of
the  cognitive  complexity  that  children can manage  before  the  age  of  4  or  5,  which
explains why younger children fail in both the DCCS and false-belief tasks.
CCC theory implicitly postulates that inhibitory processes (allegedly required by both
tasks) are subordinate to the ability to establish a higher-order rule (Happaney & Zelazo,
2003). By contrast, a more direct role is ascribed to inhibitory control in Leslie’s modular
theory  (e.g.,  Scholl  &  Leslie,  2001).  According  to  the  latter  theory,  mental-state
understanding  depends  on  two  modules.  The  first,  the  Theory-of-Mind  Mechanism
(TOMM), is devoted to processing behaviors and the underlying mental states. However,
TOMM is assumed to automatically attribute beliefs that match reality.  In false-belief
situations,  TOMM’s  initial  response  must  be  inhibited  by  Selection  Processing  (SP,  a
domain-general  inhibitory mechanism).  Leslie’s  theory thus hypothesizes that  3-year-
olds fail  in the false-belief  task because of an immature SP,  i.e.,  immature inhibitory
control. 
Although it is often acknowledged that inhibitory control is one of the main executive
components of the false-belief task, other executive functions may be involved. According
to traditional inhibition + working memory accounts, the false-belief task requires the
ability to inhibit a prepotent response and to switch between perspectives that have to be
held in working memory. Thus, both inhibitory control and working memory need to be
sufficiently developed to enable correct false-belief responses. In support of this account,
false-belief  performance has been found to be more highly correlated with executive
measures involving both inhibition and working memory than measures of inhibition
only (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003).
In line with inhibition + working memory accounts, the graded-representation framework
proposed by Munakata (2001) acknowledges the role of both memory and inhibition, but
goes  further  by  suggesting  how they  are  interrelated.  This  model  hypothesizes  that
representations are graded in nature, with the strength of a representation depending on
the amount of environmental support for it, and on the individual’s developmental state
and  neurological  integrity.  Furthermore,  there  are  two  types  of  representations  (or
memory traces):  active and latent (Morton & Munakata, 2002).  Latent representations
rapidly develop in posterior cortical areas when a stimulus is processed, and influence
stimuli processing later on (a latent bias emerges). In contrast, active representations rely
on the number of recurring connections in the prefrontal cortex (they increase during
the  preschool  years).  An  active  representation  is  formed  whenever  a  stimulus
representation is actively maintained. The two types of representations may compete in a
task and the amount of conflict is dependent on their respective strengths. A given task
may  only  require  a  weak  representation  to  be  correctly  performed  (if  no  latent
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representations compete) while another task may tap the same representation and be
incorrectly  performed  because  more  strength  is  needed  (to  overcome  a  latent
representation). Therefore, inhibitory control depends on the relative strengths of the
representations simultaneously involved, which in turn vary as a function of the child’s
memory resources. 
The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  graded-representation
framework in the field of ToM. In this approach, two conflicting representations may
compete in the false-belief task: the representation of the character’s perspective and
that of the perspective of reality. From past experiences, children may have acquired a
latent bias to infer beliefs in reference to what they know of reality because in most
situations beliefs are true. Therefore, the perspective of reality may lead to a very strong
representation.  As recurring connections are poorly developed, 3- to 4-year-olds may
only build a weak representation of the character’s perspective. This discrepancy may
lead them to incorrectly base their responses on the perspective of reality. In contrast,
older children’s development of recurring connections may enable them to maintain a
strong active representation of the character’s perspective and thus successfully perform
the task.  Previous  findings  seem to  support  this  hypothesis.  First,  when there  is  no
conflict between the latent representation and the representation of reality (i.e., children
are  given  no  information  about  the  new  location),  3-year-olds  correctly  base  their
responses on the character’s perspective (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). Second, as shown by
Clements  and  Perner  (1994)  who  videotaped  children’s  looking  behavior  while  they
performed a false-belief task, children as young as 2;11 correctly glanced at the original
location when questioned about where the character would look for the object but did not
correctly predict the character’s actions before the age of 4 years. Younger children’s
correct  looking  in  anticipation  suggests  that  their  representation  of  the  character’s
perspective is strong enough for this particular measure but is not for a more traditional
pointing/naming  criterion.  Thus,  the  graded-representation  model  accounts  for
inhibition  and  memory  demands  by  emphasizing  the  discrepancy  between  a  strong
representation of the reality perspective and a weak representation of the character’s
perspective. 
The graded-representation framework suggests that even in a conflicting situation (in
which children have information about the object’s new location), reducing the strength
difference between the two representations should favor correct responding on the basis
of the character’s perspective, and thereby improve performance. To test this hypothesis,
we created two new versions of the false-belief task, both aimed at reducing this strength
discrepancy.  In  the  “two-characters”  version,  a  new  character  whose  perspective
matched that of  reality was introduced in order to confer symmetric statuses to the
perspectives of the critical character and reality. This manipulation should help children
realize  that  many  perspectives  can  be  involved  in  this  task,  and  by  prompting  the
comparison of information available to the two characters, it should help them switch
from the perspective of reality to the critical character’s perspective1.
To our knowledge, attributing symmetric statuses to the representations simultaneously
involved in a task has only been attempted for  the appearance-reality task, in which
children are questioned about a deceiving object whose function and appearance are
incongruent  (e.g.,  a  sponge  that  looks  like  a  rock).  Plumet  and Melot  (2002)  used  a
modified version in which they projected hand shadows that looked like animals on a
wall.  Children were placed so that  they could simultaneously see the experimenter’s
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hands  and  their  animal-like  shadows  while  answering  the  traditional  reality  and
appearance  questions.  The  results  showed  that  making  both  representations  of  the
deceiving  object  physically  present  throughout  the  task  improved  3-year-olds’
performance. Plumet and Melot’s interpretation is in line with the graded-representation
model:  physically  dissociating  representations  made  them equally  salient,  and  this
facilitated activation/inhibition processes.  In  the false-belief  task,  two earlier  studies
(Robinson & Mitchell,  1995;  Perner,  Lang,  & Kloo,  2002)  have already used a  second
character, but only in justification versions of the task where the children were asked to
explain why a character looked for the object in the first location. 
Another specificity of the present study consisted in asking children three new questions
before the traditional test question. The children had to say where each character was
while the object was being moved, whether each of them saw the move, and if they knew
where the object was at the present time. These new questions about each character were
expected to strengthen the balance between the two characters’ perspectives, and thus to
help  children  contrast  them  and  get  a  better  grasp  of  the  existence  of  two
representations about the same reality. Finally, in the “two-characters+stickers” version,
the introduction of the additional character was accompanied by the presence of stickers
used as memory cues to decrease demands on working memory (Carlson et al., 2002; Hala
et al., 2003). The children were asked to put a sticker on each character. The color of the
sticker had to match the color  of  the cupboard in which the character  last  saw the
chocolate. By substituting for memory resources, the stickers should allow children to
maintain a  stronger active representation of  the critical  character’s  perspective,  and
should thereby reduce the discrepancy between it and the reality perspective.  
Traditionally,  success  and  failure  on  the  false-belief  task  have  been  considered  as
evidence for children’s knowledge or lack of knowledge about mental states, respectively.
However, the standard version may mask intermediate levels of understanding. This task
involves at least two qualitatively different conceptual aspects: it requires children (a) to
understand that different representations of a given reality coexist, and (b) to be able to
attribute  the right  representation to  each of  them.  The ability  to  attribute  different
representations  about  the  same  object  or  event,  but  doing  so  incorrectly,  may  be
indicative of the first conceptual aspect. Thus, introducing a second character into the
task might reveal this type of intermediate knowledge. 
In  summary,  the  present  study  was  aimed  at  testing  the  validity  of  a  graded-
representation account of preschoolers’ performance on the false-belief task. Two new
versions of the task were designed. In the “two-characters” version, the introduction of
an additional character should reduce the latent bias in favor of the reality perspective by
attributing more symmetric statuses to the two representations involved in the task; this
should help children understand that the characters have different representations of the
object’s location (first conceptual aspect).  The graded-representation account predicts
that children will perform better on this version than on the standard one. Because the
stickers are new environmental cues that reinforce the character’s perspective which
preschoolers tend to ignore, the “two-characters+stickers” version should be even easier
than the other two versions. As the stickers are also cues promoting the coexistence of
two  representations  and  indicative  of  which  representation  corresponds  to  which
character, they may help children make correct attributions for each character (second
conceptual  aspect).  Finally,  although  the  main  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  test  the
graded-representation model, our predictions can be compared to predictions derived
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from alternative executive accounts. Given that the additional character and the stickers
do not alter how the task is hierarchically structured since children still have to switch
perspectives,  CCC theory  suggests  that  there  will  be  no  differences  across  the  three
versions. By contrast, TOMM/SP theory emphasizes inhibition demands in the standard
false-belief task, and therefore predicts that introducing a second character should be
helpful  (giving  the  same  format  to  the  two  perspectives  should  make  the  reality
perspective easier to inhibit) and the stickers should not generate an additional benefit.
MethodParticipants
One hundred and fourteen children (58 girls and 56 boys) were recruited from two French
preschools.  They  ranged in  age  from 2;11  to  4;11  (mean age:  46.8  months;  standard
deviation: 6.6 months).  The children were split into two age groups: sixty 3-year-olds
(from 2;11 to 3;11, M = 41.4 months; SD = 2.9 months) with 20 children per condition, and
fifty-four 4-year-olds (from 4;0 to 4;11; M = 53 months; SD = 3.3 months) with 18 children
per condition.
Materials
The procedure was adapted from Wimmer and Perner (1983). Participants sat in front of a
60 x 30 x 25 cm puppet theater on which two match boxes, one green and one blue,
representing cupboards were hung. Two child puppets and one adult puppet (differing in
size,  hairdo,  and  clothes)  played  the  roles  of  Thomas,  Julie,  and  their  mother.  Only
Thomas and the mother were used in the standard version. All three puppets appeared in
the  “two-characters”  and  “two-characters+stickers”  versions.  The  mother  moved  the
object (chocolate) from the green to the blue location. Thomas was absent during the
move and Julie was present. The children’s understanding of the story was assessed by
two control questions:
Finally, the children were asked to predict each character’s action:
In the “two-characters+stickers” version, the children were asked to select green or blue
stickers  corresponding  to  the  green  and  blue  cupboards  and  to  stick  one  on  each
character to help remember the location of the chocolate. A sticker had to be attributed
to Thomas just before he left the scene. A second sticker had to be attributed to Julie
before Thomas’s return. None of the participants chose the wrong stickers. The children’s
responses (naming/pointing) to each question were recorded.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a quiet room of their preschool. Before the
task started, we made sure they could discriminate between the two cupboard colors, and
between the different characters (whose differentiating characteristics were highlighted).
Each child performed one of the three versions of the false-belief task [standard, “two-
characters” (2C), “two-characters+stickers” (2C+S)].
Results
All participants answered the control questions correctly (Memory and Reality) which
shows that they remembered where the object was placed first and where it was moved. A
few participants hesitated or did not answer.  Following Clements and Perner’s (1994)
procedure, the story was repeated once (for two 3-year-olds in the 2C condition, one 3-
year-old and one 4-year-old in the standard condition) or twice (one 3-year-old in the
standard condition, and another 3-year-old in the 2C+S condition) until they gave correct
answers.
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In the 2C and 2C+S conditions, the questions were asked about each character whereas in
the  standard  condition  the  questions  only  pertained  to  the  critical  character.
Consequently,  the  results  will  be  presented  in  two  steps.  First,  we  will  analyze  the
responses  about  the  critical  character  only  so  that  scores  across  conditions  can  be
compared. Second, we will see what considering responses about both characters reveals,
although all  questions  about  the  additional  character  led  to  very  high success  rates
(between 75% and 100%). 
Before the test question, participants had to answer a series of new questions (Place, See,
and Know). The meaning of the Know question (“Does Thomas/Julie know where the
chocolate is now?”) appeared ambiguous to the children since it could be understood as
“Does Thomas/Julie know that the chocolate’s location has changed?” (as we intended)
with correct answers being “no” for Thomas and “yes” for Julie, or “Has Thomas/Julie got
an idea of where the chocolate is?” with correct answers being “yes” for both characters.
We therefore discarded this question from the analysis2. Success rates for Place were very
high for both age groups and across all conditions and ranged from 85% to 100% (Table 1),
which  suggests,  in  conjunction  with  the  control  questions,  that  the  story  was  well
understood. In contrast, success rates for the See question improved, rising from 20% at
age 3 to 74% at age 4 [χ² (1, N=114) = 19.2, p<.0001]. Performance for See was quite high for
4-year-olds in all conditions (72% in standard, and 89% in both 2C and 2C+S). By contrast,
the  3-year-olds’  performance  on  this  question  increased  across  conditions  from 30%
correct in the standard condition to 40% in 2C and 65% in 2C+S, with 3-year-olds in 2C+S
significantly outscoring 3-year-olds in the standard condition [χ² (1, N=20) = 4.91, p=.027].
Moreover this question was positively correlated with the test question (r = .45, p<.0001).
The results for the new questions suggest that children displayed a relatively consistent
pattern of responding across questions.
Next, performance on the test question for the critical character was analyzed (success
rates are given in Table 1). Chi-square analyses revealed a highly significant effect of age,
with 28% success at 3 years and 74% at 4 years [χ² (1, N=114) = 23.8, p<.0001]. The age
effect occurred within each separate condition [χ² (1, N=38) = 6.9, p=.008 for the standard
condition, χ² (1, N=38) = 8.7, p=.003 for the 2C condition, and χ² (1, N=38) = 9.7, p=.002 for
the 2C+S condition]. As expected, success rates increased significantly across conditions
[34% of success in the standard condition, 53% in 2C, and 63% in 2C+S; χ² (2, N=114) = 6.53,
p=.038]. Pairwise comparisons showed that 2C children tended to outperform standard
condition children [χ² (1, N=76) = 2.62, p=.10]. This tendency is worth mentioning, since
the chi-square test was used here in a traditional bilateral analysis, but as suggested by
Howell  (1997),  this  significance  level  can  be  divided  by  two  because  of  our  specific
prediction that children in 2C would outperform those in the standard condition. The 2C
+S version led to significantly higher performance than the standard version [χ² (1, N
=76) = 6.4, p=.012]. Taken separately, this improvement was significant at age 4 [χ² (1, N
=36) = 5, p=.026] whereas it only tended to be so at age 3 [χ² (1, N=40) = 3.1, p=.076]. In
summary, as predicted by the graded-representation framework, the introduction of an
additional  character  tended  to  help  children  attribute  a  false  belief  to  the  critical
character, and this beneficial effect was greater when the stickers were also introduced.
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Table 1: Success rate for the Place, See, and Test questions about the critical character (absent
while the object was being moved).
Turning  now  to  the  children’s  performance  regarding  the  additional  character,  few
participants answered incorrectly on the test question concerning this character, whose
perspective matched that of reality. These errors concerned only 10 out of 76 children
(five 3-year-olds and three 4-year-olds in 2C, and two 3-year-olds in 2C+S). Eight of these
10 participants reversed the two characters’ beliefs, predicting that the character who
was absent during the move would look for the object in the new location, while the
character who remained present throughout the story would look for it in the original
location. As suggested in the introduction, this error pattern may reveal an intermediate
level of understanding, namely,  the existence of two different beliefs about the same
reality.  New  analyses  were  conducted  for  the  proportion  of  responses  revealing
acknowledgment that a false belief could be involved in the situation, irrespective of
whether  it  was  attributed to  the  right  character.  A significant  difference  was  found
between the standard and 2C conditions for all participants together [χ² (1, N=76) = 8.9, p
=.002], and within each age group [χ² (1, N=20) = 5.6, p=.018 for 3-year-olds, χ² (1, N=18) = 5,
p=.026 for 4-year-olds]. Thus, the results suggest that both two-character versions helped
the children realize that two different beliefs about the object’s location could coexist.
Moreover,  the  rates  of  false-belief  acknowledgment  (attributing  a  false  belief  to  any
character) were identical in the 2C and 2C+S conditions, with 50% of the 3-year-olds (10
children per condition) and 89% of the 4-year-olds (16 children per condition) being able
to attribute a false belief (Figure 1). This lack of a difference between 2C and 2C+S when
inversions were taken into account, and the quasi-absence of inversions in 2C+S, suggest
that the stickers helped the children make correct belief attributions to each character.
 
Figure 1. False-belief acknowledgment (in %) with or without correct attributions (by age group).
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Note: Std = standard condition
Discussion
In the present study, two new versions of the false-belief task were designed to test a
hypothesis derived from the graded-representation model (Munakata, 2001). In line with
this  hypothesis,  performance  improved  as  the  difference  in  strength  between  the
representations  of  the  critical  character’s  perspective  and  the  perspective  of  reality
decreased (standard, “two-characters”, and “two-characters+stickers” versions), although
the difference was marginally significant for the “two-characters” version. Moreover, the
new versions  revealed  a  potential  intermediate-level  of  understanding  in  which  two
different beliefs about the same reality are represented but incorrectly attributed to their
respective holders. 
An additional character that materialized the perspective of reality was introduced to
give it a status that was more directly comparable to the critical character’s perspective.
It was intended to limit children’s bias of attributing beliefs from what they know of
reality. The idea was to help them realize that several beliefs coexist in this task, and lead
them to reason on the basis of the informational state of each character. The superiority
of the “two-characters” version over the standard one was marginally significant, which
suggests that the introduction of the second character may not have been sufficient to
make  both  perspectives  equally  salient.  Having  an  additional  character  was  more
beneficial  when  it  was  accompanied  by  stickers  as  in  the  “two-characters+stickers”
version, which led to significantly better performance than in the standard task. The
stickers may be seen as environmental cues that substitute for recurring connections and
thus  allow  for  a  stronger  representation  of  the  critical  character’s  perspective.  The
success gradation pattern found here across the standard version (characterized by an
important  strength  difference  that  was  detrimental  to  the  critical  character’s
perspective), the “two-characters” version (which reduced this difference by weakening
the representation of the reality perspective), and the “two-characters+stickers” version
(which both weakened the reality perspective and strengthened the critical character’s
perspective) is consistent with the graded-representation model.
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Alternative executive approaches to false-belief performance have been advanced. CCC
theory (Frye  et  al.,  1995)  hypothesizes  that  young children fail  this  task because  its
hierarchical  rule  structure  exceeds  the  cognitive  complexity  level  they  can  manage.
However, the additional character and stickers used in our modified versions did not
change how the false-belief task was hierarchically structured, since the children still had
to switch between two perspectives. Thus, the present results do not support CCC theory.
By  contrast,  the  beneficial  effect  of  introducing  the  second character,  which can be
interpreted  as  reducing  inhibitory  demands,  is  in  line  with  executive  accounts that
emphasize inhibitory demands in ToM tasks (such as TOMM/SP theory; e.g.,  Scholl &
Leslie, 2001), which, however, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the additional
effect of the stickers. Moreover, note that it can only be inferred from inhibition accounts
that  inhibition  depends  on  the  degree  of  salience.  Munakata’s  (2001)  graded-
representation model is the only account that explicitly focuses on salience differences
across the representations involved in a task, and that states how memory resources and
inhibition are related to these differences. The latter account is thus the only one that
directly  predicts  how  performance  would  evolve  across  the  standard  and  modified
versions of the false-belief task.
Although our results highlight the role of executive aspects in the false-belief task, they
do not deny the role of conceptual development. On the contrary, they reveal a potential
intermediate-level of knowledge. Both two-character versions enabled significantly more
participants to consider the coexistence of two distinct beliefs about the same reality.
However,  considering  distinct  beliefs  was  not  always  accompanied  by  correct
attributions. This suggests that children’s knowledge about false beliefs is a graded rather
than   all-or-none  phenomenon,  and  accepting  that  different  beliefs  coexist  without
correctly attributing them may constitute an intermediate level  of  understanding.  As
most  of  the reversed attributions occurred in the “two-characters” version,  it  seems
plausible that the additional character helped the children see that each perspective gave
rise  to  a  different  belief,  but  the  beliefs  were  reversed because  of  working  memory
saturation, since inversions occurred less often when more memory cues were provided
(stickers). Further research is needed to clarify this issue.
Furthermore, before predicting the characters’ actions, children were asked whether the
critical  character  saw  the  move  (See).  Three-year-old  performance  on  this  question
improved across  conditions  and was  correlated with Test-question performance.  The
condition effect suggests that in the standard task a very salient representation of the
reality perspective causes difficulty in inferring what one sees from one’s  situational
conditions, whereas children as young as 18 months successfully infer what one sees and
knows from one’s  situational  conditions  in  situations  involving no false  beliefs  (e.g.,
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, in press).  Making the perspective of reality less salient thus
decreases this difficulty. The correlation between the See and Test questions suggests
that  success  on  the  See  question  might  be  a  potential  mediator  of  false-belief
understanding. 
In  an  important  meta-analysis,  Wellman et  al.  (2001)  pointed  out  two limitations  of
attempts to reduce the executive load of the false-belief task, both of which apply to the
present study. First, these authors interpret the fact that young children never perform
above the chance level as indicative of a lack of false-belief understanding. By contrast,
the graded-representation model hypothesizes that 3-year-olds do have some knowledge
about false beliefs but this knowledge is overridden by what they know of reality. The
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performance pattern on the  See  question and its  correlation with the  Test  question
suggest that the modified versions in the present study truly helped children answer on
the basis  of  the critical  character’s  perspective.  Second,  according to  Wellman et  al.
(2001), if 3-year-olds fail the task because of executive deficits that 4-year-olds do not
have, then reducing executive demands should not alter 4-year-olds’ performance. Yet 4-
year-olds also benefit from such reductions. This point is relevant only if there is a ceiling
effect  in  4-year-old  performance.  In  the  present  study,  only  56%  of  the  4-year-olds
successfully passed the standard task,  which is  comparable to many previous studies
showing that a large proportion of children still answer erroneously at 4 (e.g., Wimmer &
Perner, 1983; Siegal & Beatie, 1991; Robinson & Mitchell, 1995). An interesting study by
Nadel and Melot (2001) showed that 4- to 6-year-olds’ performance is still influenced by
the assessment modality, thus suggesting that reasoning about mental states continues to
progress after 4 years. Accordingly, the lack of ceiling performance is consistent with
findings indicating that many 4-year-olds are likely to benefit from a reduction of the
salience discrepancy between the perspectives involved in the task.
The  present  study  suggests  that  reducing  the  representational-strength  difference
between the reality perspective and the false belief perspective can allow 3- and 4-year-
olds  to  break  away  from  their  own  prepotent  representation  of  reality,  and  hence
consider the false-belief point of view. As such, this study adds further evidence in favor
of the graded development of an understanding of the mind.
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NOTES
1. As interestingly suggested by an anonymous reviewer, it may be argued that
materializing children’s own perspective makes it even more salient and difficult to
inhibit Yet based on the idea of graded representations, materializing the two
perspectives via the same medium (two puppets) and asking children about both
characters should prompt them to compare the two characters, and focus on their
differences. We believe that in producing a shift of attention from the perspective of
reality to the contrast that might exist between the two characters’ perspectives, the
“two-characters” version provides a context for two equally salient representations and
hence reduces the prepotency of the reality perspective.
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2. No differences across conditions were observed for the Know question (45% success in
standard and 2C+S, 47% in 2C).
ABSTRACTS
Preschoolers’difficulty in the false-belief task has generally been attributed to a deficit in false-
belief  representations.  However,  the  standard  version  of  the  task  does  not  allow  one  to
distinguish between the ability to represent and the ability to attribute false beliefs. In order to
disentangle  these  two  abilities,  114  3-  and  4-year-olds  were  tested  on  one  of  two  modified
versions  of  the task  or  on the standard version.  In  the first  modified version,  an additional
character whose perspective matched that of the participants was introduced in order to give
similar statuses to the two perspectives at stake; this was designed to help children understand
that  different  beliefs  about  a  given  reality  can  coexist.  In  a  second  modified  version,  the
introduction of  the second character  was accompanied by stickers  used as  memory cues  for
correct belief attributions. As expected, the modified versions turned out to be easier than the
standard one. Moreover, some children attributed both true and false beliefs but reversed them,
which may reflect  an intermediate level  of  knowledge.  The results  are discussed in terms of
Munakata’s (2001) graded-representation model.
On attribue généralement les difficultés des jeunes enfants à la tâche de la fausse croyance à un
défaut  de  représentation.  Cependant,  la  version  standard  de  l’épreuve  ne  permet  pas  de
distinguer les capacités de représentation et d’attribution d’une fausse croyance. Afin de mieux
apprécier chacune de ces capacités,  on a proposé à 114 enfants de 3 et 4 ans deux nouvelles
versions ou la  version standard de l’épreuve.  Dans une première variante,  on a introduit  un
second personnage dont le point de vue correspondait à celui des participants afin de conférer
des  statuts  similaires  aux  deux  points  de  vue  en  jeux  dans  la  tâche,  et  ainsi  d’aider  à  la
compréhension que différentes croyances à propos d’une même réalité peuvent co-exister. Dans
une seconde variante, l’introduction du second personnage était accompagnée d’étiquettes afin
de favoriser l’attribution correcte des croyances. Ces nouvelles versions ont effectivement été
mieux réussies que la standard. En outre, certains enfants ont attribué une vraie et une fausse
croyances mais ont inversé les personnages, laissant apparaître un éventuel niveau intermédiaire
de connaissance. Les résultats sont discutés en référence au modèle des représentations graduées
de Munakata (2001).
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